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Here we review around 20 years of experimental data that we have collected during tests of cognitive abilities of free-living, 
wild rufous hummingbirds Selasphorus rufus at their breeding grounds in southwestern Alberta.  Because these birds are 
readily trained to feed from artificial flowers they have proved a useful system for testing cognitive abilities of an animal 
outside the box wherein animal cognitive abilities are so often tested in the laboratory.  And, although these data all come 
from a single species in a single location, the long-term aim of this work is to make a contribution to our understanding of 
the evolution of cognitive abilities, by examining the relationship between the ecological demands these birds face and their 
cognitive abilities.  Testing predictions based on our knowledge of their ecology we have found that, while these birds ag-
gressively defend a territory and display to females during the time we train and test them, they can learn and remember the 
locations of rewarded flowers, what those flowers look like, and when they are likely to contain food.  Small-brained though 
they may be, these 3g hummingbirds appear to have cognitive capabilities that are not only well matched to their ecological 
demands, they are in at least some instances better (more capacious) than those of animals tested in the laboratory.  
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 Around 15 years have passed since the publication of 
Animal Cognition in Nature (Balda, Pepperberg, & Kamil, 
1998).  Ironically, this was a volume that did not, in fact, ac-
tually contain any chapters examining the cognitive abilities 
of animals in the wild.  It did, however, contain descriptions 
of work on wild animals trained and tested under labora-
tory conditions and seemed to herald a major expansion of 
work on comparative cognition to encompass a much wider 
range of species than previously tested.  A decade and a half 
later, however, it is not clear that that promise is being re-
alised.  For example, food storing, once a model for examin-
ing questions of the evolution of cognition and possibly the 
wildest of all the examples discussed in Balda et al. (1998), 
is now much less of a focus (e.g., Biegler, McGregor, Krebs, 
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& Healy, 2001; Hampton & Shettleworth, 1996; Sherry & 
Vaccarino, 1989; but see Feeney, Roberts, & Sherry, 2009; 
Freas, LaDage, Roth, & Pravosudov, 2012).  Food storing 
did, however, lead to perhaps the greatest recent flurry of 
excitement and effort in comparative cognition (Clayton & 
Dickinson, 1999): the examination of cognitive abilities in 
corvids.  Subsequent work is now ranging from examination 
of episodic-like memory in a number of species including 
rats (Babb & Crystal, 2005), magpies Pica pica (Zinkivskay, 
Nazir, & Smulders, 2009), chickadees Poecile atricapillus 
(Feeney, et al., 2009), hummingbirds (Henderson, Hurly, 
Bateson, & Healy, 2006a), and meadow voles Microtus 
pennsylvanicus (Ferkin, Combs, Delbarco-Trillo, Pierce, & 
Franklin, 2008) to examination of problem-solving in a va-
riety of contexts, typically by corvids but not always (Au-
ersperg, Huber, & Gajdon, 2011; Dally, Emery, & Clayton, 
2010; Schmidt, Scheid, Kotrschal, Bugnyar, & Schloegl, 
2011; Taylor, Elliffe, Hunt, & Gray, 2010; Teschke & Teb-
bich, 2011; Weir, Chappell, & Kacelnik, 2009).
 In fact, much of comparative cognition can be comfort-
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ably addressed in the laboratory, even when wild animals are 
tested.  This may help to explain why there continues to be 
very little examination of cognitive abilities of animals in the 
wild, in what might be considered to be the real world.  That 
world is one in which animals are faced daily with getting 
food, finding mates, avoiding predation, and this is where se-
lection acts on cognitive abilities, perhaps favouring animals 
that are generally smart or, alternatively, favouring animals 
that are good at solving particular problems.  The questions, 
then, differ slightly from those asked of animals in a labora-
tory i.e., not just what animals can do but what and how do 
they put those abilities to work when the test itself does not 
occupy much of their day.  It is possible that we will find that 
animals’ cognitive abilities in the field differ little or not at 
all from those we see in the laboratory.  For example, the use 
of food deprivation in the laboratory to motivate animals to 
perform a test may resemble the state in which many wild 
animals find themselves i.e., often hungry and very willing 
to work for reliable food rewards.  On the other hand, having 
to watch out for predators or competitors may mean that ani-
mals attend to experimental features differently than if they 
were to be tested in the field or the spatial scale over which 
testing occurs (Figure 1). Natural conditions might also lead 
to different cue use or different cue weighting than we see 
when animals are tested in boxes, arenas or (relatively) small 
rooms in the laboratory. 
respond or does not ‘know’ how to respond.  Only when the 
animal does make a response that seems vaguely appropri-
ate can we begin to measure its performance.  Even then, 
variation in its performance may be due to motivation rather 
than to cognitive ability per se.  In the field the animal may 
be distracted mid-test or simply fail to return to the test after 
failing to find a reward.  A second major issue that has arisen 
with recent tests of cognitive ability in the wild is with the 
‘unit of measurement’ for cognitive ability, especially when 
problem solving is that measure.  Thus far, we are not aware 
of a general consensus as to what constitutes a problem or 
what makes one problem more difficult than another.  For 
example, currently, manipulation of physical material to re-
trieve food from manmade devices is considered by some to 
require ‘complex’ cognition although an apparently similar 
manipulation of materials to build a nest, however complex, 
is not (Seed & Byrne, 2010; but see Muth & Healy, 2011; 
Walsh, Hansell, & Healy, 2010; Walsh, Hansell, Borello, 
& Healy, 2011; van Casteren, Sellers,  Thorpe, Coward, 
Crompton, Myatt, & Ennos, 2012).  Is a problem considered 
more difficult if it has more steps to the solution, even if 
each step is ‘easy’, or is a problem more difficult if it is more 
novel, either in appearance or in its solution?  It would seem 
that there is a problem in using problem solving as a measure 
for cognitive abilities in animals.  And if we have no mea-
sure that is readily quantifiable, then it will not be possible 
to determine the causes or consequences of variation in that 
measure, within or across species.
 It will come as no surprise that we have not attempted to 
examine problem solving in our work examining the cogni-
tive abilities of rufous hummingbirds, trained and tested in 
the wild at our field site in the eastern Rocky Mountains, Al-
berta, Canada.  At least, we have not looked at their ability to 
manipulate tools or to solve problems of the kinds that crows 
and others are now being set.  Rather we have required our 
birds to learn to feed from all manner of devices (Figure 2), 
which they have invariably been very quick to do, typically 
learning within a couple of hours where to insert their tongue 
to receive sugar solution (sucrose).  Although some might 
say that speed of learning in itself indicates cognitive ability 
(e.g., Boogert, Fawcett, & Lefebvre, 2011; Keagy, Savard, & 
Borgia, 2012), the fact that these birds learn so readily has for 
us largely meant that they are a useful species for examining 
cognition in the field: animals that took 100’s or 1000’s of 
trials to learn how to solve a task would have led us to look 
for other species.  Here we review our work with two aims 
in mind: (1) to show that basing an experimental framework 
on knowing the ecology of a species can lead to a useful 
understanding of that species’ cognitive abilities, and, (2) in 
light of the paucity of work done in the wild, we want to use 
our work on rufous hummingbirds as a case study to show 
what is possible to do in the messiness of the field, where 
Figure 1. A photo showing the landscape in which we train 
and test our hummingbirds.  Birds typically defend territories 
that contain both open fields and some wooded areas.  In this 
photo, one bird defended a territory at the far end of the field 
and a second male defended a territory around the location 
at which the photograph was taken.  Photo by T. A. Hurly.
 Going out into the field to test cognitive abilities cer-
tainly shares problems with laboratory tests, not least of 
which is being sure that the animal ‘answers’ the question 
experimenters think they are asking.  If an animal fails to 
respond in an experiment, for example, it is frequently un-
clear whether this is because the animal is not motivated to 
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our control over the animal’s behaviour and experience is 
compromised.  We would hope to show that such a pursuit 
can be both fruitful and that by doing so we add usefully 
to our understanding of cognition acquired from laboratory 
experiments.  By so doing we would hope to encourage oth-
ers similarly to go out into the field to examine cognition 
in other species.  If we want to understand the evolution of 
cognitive abilities, especially in the vertebrates, the answers 
will not come from work on a single species, irrespective of 
the depth of enquiry. 
they feed every 10-15 minutes throughout the day for the 
duration of the breeding season (Figure 3).  Although one 
might say that cognition is studied in the laboratory for lo-
gistic reasons such as experimental and experiential control, 
the choice of a species to test in the wild is, at this relatively 
early stage of such work, crucial to success.  For example, 
the fact that our hummingbirds feed every 10-15 minutes 
means that we can collect a useful amount of data within a 
day and across our six-week field season.  Choosing to work 
with animals that feed once a day or less often, would lead 
Figure 2. Four examples of the kind of feeding device to which the birds can be readily trained.  With these ‘flowers’ we can 
vary the quantity of sucrose, the number of flowers, their spatial proximity and their visual features.  The photograph at the 
top left is of a board of the kind we use in the context-dependent experiments.  The next two photographs show birds about 
to and feeding from our most commonly-used flower type, a cardboard disc with a central well formed from a syringe tip or 
cap. The bottom right photograph shows a hummingbird choosing florets on artificial inflorescences.  Photos by T. A. Hurly.
 Interested as we are in comparative cognition, we have 
two significant reasons for attempting to determine the cog-
nitive abilities in a single species, specifically rufous hum-
mingbirds, in the wild.  Firstly, these birds are logistically 
amenable to testing.  As described elsewhere (e.g., Healy & 
Hurly, 2003, 2004), the males (the focus of our efforts) are 
strongly territorial, excluding conspecifics from feeding and 
thus from being trained to use our experimental equipment, 
they can be readily marked for individual identification and 
to major issues with training animals and collecting enough 
data, without each study taking a lifetime!
 Equally key to the success of the endeavour is that the 
behaviour and ecology of these birds is such that we can 
readily formulate predictions as to the nature of the birds’ 
cognitive abilities from our observations of the birds’ forag-
ing behaviour.  Rather than using a rather arbitrary task to 
examine their cognitive abilities, we can attempt to test those 
abilities we would expect might have been favoured in these 
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particular animals.  Foraging behaviour in the male rufous 
hummingbirds, at least, typically consists of a male flying 
approximately every 10 minutes from a conspicuous perch 
in his territory to feed (from flowers or our feeders; Figure 
4) for a handful of seconds before returning to his perch. 
The intervening time before his next foraging bout can be 
filled with a considerable activity as he is constantly on the 
lookout for conspecific males and females.  Territorial males 
display to conspecific rivals by the flashing of their bright 
orange gorget (throat) feathers.  If this does not deter an in-
truder, it will be chased off at high speed.  Females are also 
chased, especially off the feeders, but they tend to move to 
a position near the ground while the male performs several 
display flights.  These consist of the male flying up (some 
15m) and then flying steeply downwards before pulling out 
of his dive just above the head of the female, flying a short 
upward sweep and ending with a waggle (a short series of 
oscillations in the vertical plane).  He then either repeats this 
manoeuvre several times or flies to the female and performs 
a shuttle-flight - a series of short zig-zag buzzing flights in 
front of her.  The aim of this game is to persuade the female 
to mate (Hurly, Scott, & Healy, 2001).  Although we have not 
measured the energy expenditure of the males’ various flight 
acrobatics, it appears that they would be energetically ex-
pensive (Clark, 2009).  Indeed, males tend to visit the feeder 
(flowers) within a few minutes of such displays, although 
their visits are still no longer than a few seconds.  Our very 
first speculation with regard to their cognitive abilities, then, 
was that this small (about 3g) nectarivore, defending several 
hundred (or more) flowers and feeding about every ten min-
utes for a few seconds only, might benefit from remembering 
which flowers he had recently visited (Healy & Hurly 2001). 
Not only would he save time and energy by remembering 
where they were, it should be useful to remember whether he 
had emptied the flower(s), or not.  A bird that could do this 
would return to territory defence and mate attraction more 
quickly having expended less energy.
 The success of our very first, speculative experiment set 
the scene for most of the experiments that have followed. 
In that first experiment, we presented rufous hummingbirds 
with an open-field analogue of a radial-arm maze: an array of 
artificial flowers, some of which contained a small amount of 
sucrose solution (Healy & Hurly, 1995).  The flowers were 
Figure 3. Photographs showing the elevated feeder (to deter bears) being lowered during pre-training (left), a newly 
marked bird in the hand (top right) and a marked bird feeding during an experiment (bottom right).  Photos by T. A. Hurly.
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coloured cardboard discs approximately 6cm in diameter, 
each glued to the end of a wooden stake 60cm tall (Figures 
2 and 5).  They were arranged in a rough circle with about 
70cm between neighbouring flowers.  For this experiment, 
the flowers held 40µl, an amount that meant the birds should 
visit and drink all of the contents of about four of the eight 
flowers.  We presented the birds with two versions of this 
delayed-non-matching-to-sample task: in one version, all 
eight flowers contained reward but we allowed birds to visit 
only up to four flowers on their first visit to the array and in 
the second version, all eight stakes were presented but only 
four bore flowers.  For both versions, then, birds visited and 
emptied up to four flowers of their contents.  On their return 
to the array, after intervals ranging from five minutes up to 
an hour, all eight flowers were present but only the flowers 
that had not been visited in the first phase of the trial con-
tained food.  As predicted, the birds were much more likely 
to visit flowers they had not recently emptied.  A follow-up 
experiment showed that birds were also more likely to visit 
the flowers that had been present when they first visited the 
array but from which they did not drink (Hurly, 1996; see 
also Henderson, Hurly, & Healy, 2001).  Although memory 
for perhaps as many eight flowers is not in the ball park of 
the number of flowers thought to make up the territory of 
these birds (perhaps a couple of thousand), the birds could 
remember not just where the flowers were but that they had 
emptied them. 
 That the birds could remember something about a flower’s 
contents was confirmed by an experiment in which we were 
Figure 4. Once they arrive at our field site, the males establish feeding territories centred around feeders we have hung 
along the valley a week or two before they arrive.  Typically the feeders contain 14% sucrose, which is much weaker than 
the nectar provided by the flowers from which the birds would normally feed.  Photo by T. A Hurly.
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actually aiming to address the role that flower colour played 
in the birds’ ability to learn which flowers to visit.  We ex-
pected that the birds would pay attention to the colour of the 
flowers both because, like us, birds have well-developed co-
lour vision and there is much anecdotal evidence that hum-
mingbirds are attracted to red objects.  There was also specu-
lation that this predilection for red had lead to the propensity 
for the Californian flora, which lie on the migratory path of 
these birds, to produce red flowers.  In that experiment we 
presented the birds with four, individually coloured flowers, 
only one of which contained sucrose solution and too much 
for a bird to consume in one visit.  Once a bird had found 
the rewarded flower and then left after drinking as much as 
he wished, we emptied the flower and switched it with one 
of the other flowers in the array.  When the bird returned, he 
was more likely to go to the flower that was in the location 
of the flower he had most recently fed from, rather than to 
the flower with the colour of the earlier, rewarded flower 
(Hurly & Healy, 1996; Miller & Miller, 1971; Miller, Tamm, 
Sutherland, & Gass, 1985).  Consideration of the nature of 
the birds’ ecology helps to explain why these bird seemed 
to ignore the colour cue provided by the flower: in a field 
of flowers of the same species, colour does not help the bird 
determine which flowers will be rewarding.  Colour might, 
however, be used to find flowers in unfamiliar places, such 
as along a migratory route and red may well be more con-
spicuous against a background of browns and greens that 
make up a western North American mountain range.  It has 
also been argued elsewhere that the ubiquity of red flowers 
along the migration route of the rufous has less to do with 
attracting hummingbirds than making flowers inconspicu-
ous to insects, whose vision is poorer at longer wavelengths 
(Altshuler, 2003; Briscoe & Chittka, 2001; Raven, 1972).
 The longer we have experimented with these birds, the 
more we have found evidence for their ability to learn in-
formation as is necessary, because we have found they will 
learn and remember the colours of flowers, we just had to 
ask them in the appropriate fashion.  Two examples will 
illustrate this.  Firstly, in an experiment in which we were 
primarily interested in the accuracy with which they could 
remember a location, some birds were trained that yellow 
flowers were rewarded while others were taught that red 
flowers were rewarded.  This colour-reward association was 
learned within 2-3 experiences (Hurly & Healy, 1996).  Sec-
ondly, we trained birds that three of the flowers in an array of 
ten contained sucrose solution.  All of the flowers differed in 
their colour pattern.  Once the birds had learned which were 
the rewarded flowers we moved the array 2m from the site 
of the original array so the birds could not use the location of 
the flowers to determine which were the rewarded flowers. 
However, it was not until we had also changed the shape of 
the moved array that we found that the birds had remembered 
Figure 5. Flowers in an array used by Rachael Marshall 
(in photo) in one of her timing experiments, showing the 
proximity of the experimenter to the array. Photo by T. A. 
Hurly.
the colours of the flowers rewarded in the first array (Hurly 
& Healy, 2002; Figure 6).  The birds can and will learn and 
remember colour but our ability to demonstrate that they can 
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and will do so required us to be much more particular about 
our experimental designs.  We would have been both remiss 
and incorrect if we had concluded that rufous hummingbirds 
were unable to learn colour cues, a very ubiquitous cognitive 
ability.
 Not only do we have to be particular about our experimen-
tal designs, we also have to be careful about our expectations 
of what these birds may or may not be capable.  Expecta-
tions of animals’ cognitive abilities tend to come from two 
sources, some based on knowledge of the animals’ ecology 
and others from what might loosely be described as being 
based on their brain size.  Rufous hummingbirds weigh 
around 3g and, although they have a brain that is larger than 
expected for their body size (Ward, Day, Wilkening, Wylie, 
Hurly, & Healy, 2012) and they can visit several such ‘emp-
ty’ locations.  Usefully, hummingbirds can demonstrate their 
memory for a rewarding location in the absence of the local 
cues of that reward because they will fly to, and then hover 
at, that location, much as a rat in a water maze will swim 
back and forth over the place it has learned to find a hidden 
platform. 
 Although we have not measured the accuracy with which 
the birds can return to a flower that has been removed after a 
single visit, we have attempted to measure the 3-D accuracy 
of memories for a familiar location.  We trained birds to fly 
to a rewarded flower (a red 8cm3 cardboard cube) in a large 
featureless field, then removed the flower and filmed the 
bird’s flight path into the location of the now-missing flower. 
The birds flew to within 60cm in the horizontal plane and 
within 20cm in the vertical plane (Hurly, Franz, & Healy, 
2010).  They did not appear to beacon to the flower in spite 
of the ‘flower’ being highly conspicuous, as when we sim-
ply moved the flower about 1.5m, the birds flew nearer to 
the location of the missing flower, and hovered, before fly-
ing directly to the moved flower.  The birds’ accuracy for a 
flower’s location seems to depend on the size of the flower. 
In a second experiment, we trained birds to feed from ei-
ther a small (8cm3) or a large flower (1000cm3).  This time, 
in the absence of the flower, the birds flew even closer to 
its previous location than they had in the earlier experiment 
(the locations were not the same in the two presentations): 
20cm in the horizontal and around 5cm in the vertical when 
the flower was small and around 50cm in the horizontal and 
about 25cm in the vertical when the flower was large.  These 
data finally allowed us to confirm the precision with which 
a hummingbird can return to a learned but absent reward de-
scribed in the many anecdotes of hummingbirds returning to 
sites of feeders they had fed from during their last migration 
or breeding season.  The appearance of birds at particular 
windows of houses is a common incentive for people to get 
feeders out of the cupboard after the winter.
 One obvious difference for the birds in our experiments 
from the birds in these reports, however, was that we delib-
erately chose to place the experimental flower at least 10m 
from any obvious landmarks (e.g., bushes, trees; Figures 1 
and 5).  The data from experiments on various species in the 
laboratory would suggest that the birds might have learned 
the flower’s location in one of three ways: they may have 
learned the visual characteristics of the flower and used it 
as a beacon, they could have used the landmarks proximal 
to the flower or, they used a number of distal landmarks. 
The behaviour of our real-world animals, however, does not 
readily conform to any of these three possibilities: while 
they can use the flower as a beacon, as shown by the birds 
flying to the moved flower once they discover the one in the 
familiar location is missing, they do not need to beacon to 
Figure 6. Schematic of the arrays used to determine that the 
birds did learn and remember colour (redrawn from Healy 
and Hurly 2002, above – treatment; below - control).
Saucier, & Iwaniuk, 2012), that brain is still not very large. 
Knowledge of the birds’ ecology leads to expectations that 
these birds might, for example, pay more attention to spatial 
information than to colour information (but that they would 
still pay attention to colour in the relevant contexts), while 
their brain size might lead to expectations of noticeable lim-
its to the capacity for and speed and the accuracy with which 
the birds learn spatial locations.  We are familiar with one-
trial learning from the retrieval successes of food-storers and 
from long-delay taste aversion learning but even in tasks 
where animals are highly motivated to learn locations such 
as in rats searching for hidden platforms in the Morris water 
maze, animals often either take several trials to learn a loca-
tion or require some time exploring the location in a first 
visit.  Like food-storing birds, rufous hummingbirds, how-
ever, learn the three-dimensional location of a reward from a 
single visit that lasts only a few seconds.  They can return to 
that location even in the absence of the flower (Flores Abreu, 
Cognition in the wild 20
the flower and they do not do so preferentially.  Graham, 
Fauria, & Collett, (2003) suggested that their ants might use 
large landmarks along a route as beacons while learning that 
route and that those landmarks might act as a scaffold for 
learning other landmarks nearby so that the animals could 
move along the route if the beacons were then removed. 
While this seems plausible for our hummingbirds it is not at 
all clear which landmarks along the way would have formed 
this scaffold.  The proximal landmarks were (to our eyes, 
at least) remarkably uniform: the ground was quite flat, and 
covered by vegetation that reached perhaps 20cm punctured 
by multiple ground squirrel burrows.  The distal landmarks, 
on the other hand, were very conspicuous and ranged from 
trees, typically ringing the open fields used for training and 
testing, to the mountains rising some 1000m along both sides 
of the valley and visible from all points in the open fields. 
However, it was still not clear how such large landmarks 
would enable the birds to be quite so accurate in their return 
to the flower location.  It is possible that the birds did not use 
visual cues at all as they may well have used magnetic or sun 
compass cues instead but there is no reason to believe that 
such cues would be better at supporting accuracy than are 
distal visual landmarks.  We have no useful information on 
the use of either of these systems in hummingbirds although 
there is an abundance of data for their use by other birds so 
it seems at least plausible that hummingbirds might also use 
them.  We also cannot reject the possibility that the birds 
did use either proximal or distal visual landmarks simply be-
cause we cannot yet determine which they might have used 
or how they might have used them.
 Surprisingly, these data on the memory that humming-
birds have for rewards located in three-dimensional space 
are among only a handful of data on spatial cognition in 
3-D (Grobéty & Schenk, 1992; Holbrook & Burt de Perera, 
2009; Holbrook & Burt de Perera, 2011).  Although all flying 
and swimming animals live their lives moving through 3-D 
space, even terrestrial animals can and will move through 
the vertical dimension of their world and yet, we know al-
most nothing about whether the z-dimension is encoded dif-
ferently from the way in which x and y dimensions are en-
coded, whether the animals pay attention to the dimensions 
differently or whether either or both of these are dependent 
on whether the animal moves through the z-dimension.  Ru-
fous hummingbirds might remember flowers better if they 
differ in their height (Henderson, Hurly, & Healy, 2006b) 
and they may also remember a 3-D location more accurately 
than do rats, when both species have learned a location in a 
3-D maze (Flores Abreu, 2012).  Whether these outcomes 
are due to greater familiarity with moving through 3-D space 
or to an ability that has been favoured by natural selection is 
not yet clear and requires investigation of 3-D spatial perfor-
mance in more species.
 That performance depends on the way in which the ques-
tion is asked is demonstrated yet again because humming-
birds apparently encode vertical information less accurately 
than horizontal information when the locations to be dis-
criminated differ only in their vertical component: when 
flowers were presented on a vertical pole (Figure 7), birds 
found it difficult to learn which one of five flowers was re-
warded but when the flowers were presented along a diago-
nal pole, the birds were relatively quick to learn which was 
the rewarded flower (Flores Abreu, Hurly, & Healy, 2013). 
Here it appears that the addition of a horizontal component 
to the flower’s location may have facilitated the learning of 
its vertical location.  Additionally, when presented with only 
two flowers the location of which differed only in the verti-
cal component, hummingbirds appeared to learn which was 
the rewarded flower relative to the other i.e., whether the 
flower was the upper or the lower of the two flowers (Hen-
derson et al., 2006b).
 Unlike 3-D spatial cognition, a considerable amount of 
work has been conducted on a variety of species into the 
ways they learn and use time.  Interval timing over short 
time periods has been well studied in the laboratory while 
circadian timing has been much investigated in both the 
laboratory and the field (e.g., Sylvia borin, Biebach, Falk, 
& Krebs, 1989; pigeons Columba livia, Saksida & Wilkie, 
1994; hamsters Mesocricetus auratus, Cain, Chou, & Ralph, 
2004; and bees Apis mellifera, Pahl, Zhu, Pix, Tautz, & 
Zhang, 2007).  More recently, investigations into episodic-
like memory (often also called what-where-when memory) 
have also raised questions as to what kind of time constitutes 
the ‘when’ component of this kind of memory.  There are a 
priori reasons to suppose that rufous hummingbirds might 
also be capable of using more than one kind of time.  For ex-
ample, it has been suggested that territorial hummingbirds, 
like the rufous, use defence by exploitation as a means to 
exclude nectarivorous intruders and that this is effected by 
the territorial holder feeding on, and thereby emptying, the 
flowers at the edge of his territory early in the day (Paton 
& Carpenter, 1984).  Traplining, whereby an animal moves 
around a circuit of resources (such as flowers) in a predict-
able pattern and time period, may also be used by foraging 
hummingbirds that are using their floral resources effective-
ly (Feinsinger & Colwell, 1978).  Finally, for hummingbirds 
foraging on flowers that refill their nectar supplies (perhaps 
within a few hours), being able to remember which flow-
ers they visited and when, would enable more effective for-
aging.  The biology of these birds, then, suggests that they 
might be capable of circadian timing, sequence learning and/
or interval timing.
 Given the possible daily requirement for remembering 
when flowers had been emptied, we began investigating the 
hummingbirds’ ability to learn time intervals by presenting 
Cognition in the wild 21
were chosen by the bird.  The array was presented in the 
morning and the territory owner was allowed to visit at will 
throughout the day.  The flowers were removed overnight 
and replaced in the same place the following day.  As we did 
not know how long it would take for a bird to learn the refill 
rates (if at all), we presented each of three territorial birds 
with an eight-flower array for 11 days.  It turned out that the 
birds had, in fact, learned the refill rates quite well by the 
end of the first day (our expectations of their performance 
vastly underestimated their abilities) but the key finding was 
that all three birds returned to the 10-minute refilling flowers 
at around 10 minutes and to the 20-minute refilling flowers 
at around 20 minutes (Henderson et al., 2006a).  Although 
these time periods are much shorter than typical refilling 
times for real flowers and birds may defend up to a couple 
of thousand flowers in their territories, we considered that 
the Henderson et al. (2006a) data at least showed ‘proof of 
principle’ and that these birds could learn refill rates, for 
multiple flowers and relatively quickly.  Furthermore, not 
only were the duration of the refill rates longer and the num-
ber of flowers that the birds could track more than has been 
tested in the laboratory, all of the birds were living a very 
active life throughout their foraging on the array, defend-
ing their territory from intruding males and displaying to 
females.  One suspects that if these birds were tested in the 
more controlled environment of a laboratory, their abilities 
would seem even more impressive.  Rather than testing them 
in the laboratory, we then looked to see whether, if the co-
lour of the flower signalled the refill rate, the birds would 
use that colour and learn the refill rate of the flower more 
quickly than if there was no colour-refill association.  This 
was one of the instances in which we based our expectation 
of what the birds would learn on the information we would 
be likely to use ourselves: if the 10-minute refilling flow-
ers were blue and the 20-minute refilling flowers were pink, 
for example, it would seem that the colour might reduce the 
time taken to learn the refill schedule.  However, it did not 
affect the speed at which the birds learned which flowers 
refilled after 10 minutes and which refilled after 20 minutes 
(Marshall, Hurly, & Healy, 2012; Figure 5).  Indeed, there 
is some preliminary evidence that colour-refill associations 
may also not affect the speed with which people learn the 
duration before which flowers refill (Marshall, 2012).  In a 
second experiment reported by Marshall et al., (2012), birds 
also did not learn which flowers held 20% sucrose solution 
and which held 30% sucrose sooner when the flower colour 
signalled the sucrose concentration.  Of course, our earlier 
data whereby birds did not appear to learn the colour of a 
flower when its location did not change should have alerted 
us to the probability that colour would also not be salient to 
the birds in the Marshall et al. (2012) experiment, or at least, 
not as salient as is space.  It appears that space overshadows 
colour information in a range of contexts.  One way to test 
Figure 7. Photographs showing the flower arrays used 
by Ileana Nuri Flores Abreu to examine the use by the 
hummingbirds of horizontal and vertical information. 
Photos by I. N. Flores Abreu.
a bird with an array of eight, individually distinctive flow-
ers, four of which were refilled 10 minutes after the bird had 
emptied them and four were refilled 20 minutes after being 
emptied.  Each flower had contained the same amount and 
concentration of sucrose so the time to refill was not an in-
dicator of a flower’s contents and the amount in a flower 
was such that the bird would typically visit 3-5 flowers per 
visit to the array.  However, he could visit all the flowers or 
only one, the number of flowers and which flowers to visit 
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this would be to move the flowers after each visit.  In such 
a manipulation, space would no longer be a reliable cue and 
colour would be. 
 Having found that the hummingbirds could learn refill 
rates, and in experiments on risk sensitivity and context-
dependent choice, that they readily learn what (volume 
and concentration of sucrose) is held in flowers or wells of 
different colours, it was clear that these birds could learn 
and remember each of the three (what-where-when) com-
ponents of episodic-like memory (Hurly & Oseen, 1999; 
Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2002; 2003; Morgan, Hurly, Bate-
son, Asher, & Healy, 2012).  They can also remember pairs 
of these components: they can remember when and where 
(Henderson et al., 2006a) and they can remember what and 
where (e.g., Healy & Hurly 1995; 1998) although we have 
not explicitly looked for whether they can remember what 
and when together.  The question then was whether they 
could remember all three components together.  Although 
there is now considerable evidence that a range of animals 
have episodic-like memory, including rats (Babb & Crystal, 
2005), magpies (Zinkivskay et al., 2009), chickadees (Fee-
ney et al., 2009), and meadow voles (Ferkin et al., 2008), 
issues over designing an appropriate experiment continue to 
plague this field.  The most systematic difficulty concerns 
the ‘when’ component, with differing groups defining this 
in different ways (e.g., including a place in a sequence: Er-
gorul & Eichenbaum, 2004; a time of day: Zhou & Crystal, 
2009; and using “which” instead of “when”: Eacott, Easton, 
Zinkivskay, 2005; Eacott & Norman, 2004).  Common to 
all of these approaches, however, is that the test would al-
low animals to demonstrate their ability to remember what, 
where and when in combination.  We took a slightly different 
approach again, which was to design an experiment in which 
we could explicitly examine all of the components of what-
where and when memory.  We did this by presenting birds 
with a pair of four-flowers arrays in which the single flower 
that contained reward differed for the different times of day 
at which the arrays were presented.  The distinctive colours 
of the four flowers in each array (e.g., blue, yellow, purple, 
and red; Figure 8) occurred in the same relative positions for 
both arrays.  The arrays were presented in the morning and 
a territorial male was allowed to search around the flowers 
to find the rewarded flower.  He was then allowed to return 
to the arrays to feed from the rewarded flower for a further 
five visits before the arrays were removed.  The arrays were 
presented again in the afternoon and the bird had again to 
find the rewarded flower.  In this latter array presentation, 
the rewarded flower was in the other array and of one of the 
other colours.  After five subsequent visits to the rewarded 
flower, the arrays were removed.  They were presented to the 
bird over the next few days at approximately the same times 
each day.  Over the course of these presentations we found 
that birds visited the eight different flowers differently: there 
was a single ‘correct’ flower, which was in the correct ar-
ray at the correct time and of the correct colour, one flower 
that was in the correct array and of the correct colour but at 
the wrong time, one flower that was at the correct time and 
of the correct colour but the wrong array, three flowers that 
were in the correct array at the correct time, and two flowers 
that were wrong array, at the wrong time and of the wrong 
colour.  The most common flower the birds chose was the re-
warded flower and they went least frequently to the flowers 
that were completely wrong (Marshall, 2012).  Of the other 
kinds of flowers, relative to chance, the birds went most of-
ten to the flower that was rewarded at the other time of day, 
which is consistent with the data from episodic-like memory 
tests where it is the when component that is the most difficult 
for the animal to get right.  Furthermore, the birds most read-
ily corrected what errors as they typically flew from a what 
error flower directly to the correct flower.  These outcomes 
are consistent with what we have seen in other experiments 
with the birds: they have good spatial memory and they 
seem to remember colour only when space is not relevant. 
Although this experiment was not an episodic-like memory 
experiment as the birds visited the arrays six times at each 
time period and the trials were not trial-unique, this kind of 
experimental design might enable a comparison across spe-
cies in their episodic-like memories of how well they can 
remember each of the three components.  For example, do 
other animals remember the where better than the what and 
the when as do hummingbirds?  Might a species’ ecology 
enable us to predict the pattern of variation in the structure of 
episodic-like memories (if there is one)?  It might also help 
to determine which species serves as the most useful model 
of human episodic memories.  The data from this experiment 
also suggest that, in addition to being capable of learning 
intervals, the birds can learn circadian time.
 One-trial learning of 3-D locations, accurate spatial 
memory and timing capacity: these animals have cognitive 
capabilities that appear to match their ecological require-
ments, although we have not actually tested the extent of 
these abilities (e.g., whether the birds can remember most 
of the flowers in their territories, rather than the handful on 
which we have tested them).  For us, this raises multiple 
questions, such as how specific are these abilities?  Is it the 
case, for example, that other animals are also capable of this 
kind of timing capacity or has natural selection favoured this 
particularly in the hummingbirds and only in other species 
that have faced similar cognitive challenges in their forag-
ing strategy (or in some other part of their lifestyle)?  This 
question requires comparative data, of the kind gathered to 
address similar questions asked of the capacities of food 
storers relative to nonstorers, of sticklebacks living in differ-
ent environments, and a handful of other species (Girvan & 
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Braithwaite, 1998; McGregor & Healy, 1999; Odling-Smee, 
Boughman, & Braithwaite, 2008). 
 Accurate spatial memory and timing capabilities allow 
rufous hummingbirds to make appropriate decisions about 
which flowers to visit and when and we have used their 
ecology to make predictions about their cognitive capabili-
ties.  We have also used data from the literature on human 
decision-making to ask questions about whether or not these 
birds make so-called irrational decisions.  A rational deci-
sion is one in which the animal/human faced with an array 
of options is expected to choose the option that obtains the 
highest utility.  For animals, the utility of a foraging option is 
considered to be the one that provides the highest energetic 
return.  For humans, utility might be measured in terms of 
energy, finance, or some other useful currency and humans 
were also always assumed to make rational choices.  How-
ever, there is now a wealth of data to show that humans do 
not always make rational decisions and increasing evidence 
to show that animals, including rufous hummingbirds, also 
do not make such decisions (Bateson et al., 2002; 2003; 
Hurly & Oseen, 1999; Latty & Beekman, 2011; Morgan et 
al., 2012; Sasaki & Pratt, 2011; Scarpi, 2011, Waite, 2001). 
One of the experimental paradigms used to show that ru-
fous hummingbirds are irrational consists of offering birds a 
choice between two favourable options (a binary choice set; 
Figure 2) and a choice among three options, the two favour-
able options from the binary choice set plus a third poorer 
option.  If the birds were choosing rationally, the inclusion 
of the poorer option should not affect the relative preference 
the birds have for the two favourable options, but it does 
(Bateson et al., 2002; 2003; Morgan et al., 2012).  One sug-
gested mechanism for this change in preference is that sam-
pling of the poorer option forces birds to take relatively more 
of the better of the two favourable options to regain the lost 
energy.  However, the hummingbirds do not always respond 
to the poorer option by increasing their preference for the 
option with the highest energy return (Morgan et al., 2012). 
Another possibility is that the birds assess the options avail-
able relative to each other rather than with respect to their 
Figure 8. Schematic of the what-where-when experiment in which time of day was the ‘when’.
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absolute values.  This might mean then, that the inclusion of 
a poor option in the choice set might make the better of two 
favourable options seem much better than when just the two 
favourable options are presented and so a bird should in-
crease its relative preference for that better option.  It might 
also mean that the inclusion of very poor option to the choice 
set would lead the bird to perceiving the two favourable op-
tions as more similar to each other, which would result in 
a bird choosing the two favourable options more similarly 
than it had when presented with the binary choice.  Just this 
experiment is currently underway.  
 Why hummingbirds might make irrational decisions over 
foraging options is not yet clear.  There are at least two pos-
sibilities that have been raised to explain irrational human 
decision making: 1) the birds are perceptually or cognitively 
constrained and are simply unable to measure each of the 
options sufficiently accurately to make the appropriate (ra-
tional) choice; 2) the birds are capable of measuring the 
available options but trade off making the perfect decision 
with the time taken to make the measurements as the costs 
of making the perfect decision at every foraging choice (for 
hummingbirds around every 10 minutes through the day) 
well outweigh the benefits of that decision.  This latter seems 
intuitively more likely as no one foraging decision for these 
birds will be worth a bird spending a lot of time assessing the 
options.  However, whether the frequent foraging for small 
meals means that these birds are more likely to make irra-
tional decisions than are animals making more substantive 
decisions (in fitness terms), such as mate choice or offspring 
sex ratio is not yet clear.  This is also a question that would 
be best addressed by a comparative approach, both within 
and among species.  For example, rufous hummingbirds 
choosing mates may not trade off time with assessment ac-
curacy because this is a decision that has medium to long-
term fitness effects.  Similarly, animals that feed on few but 
large meals as do many top predators may also be prepared 
to take longer to choose among foraging options in order 
to ensure they choose the option with the highest energetic 
return.
 More comparative data would help to determine the role 
that cognition plays in the lives of animals and that is played 
by natural selection in producing variation in cognitive abili-
ties.  We are beginning to determine the cognitive capabili-
ties of rufous hummingbirds when those animals are living 
a fast and furious life in the midst of our experiments.  We 
consider that this work brings us considerably closer to un-
derstanding the use to which these animals could put their 
cognitive abilities than if we had conducted this work in the 
laboratory.  In the real world, the benefits to cognitive abili-
ties might range from the short term such as finding food 
for a single meal to the medium term such as managing to 
attract a good mate (Keagy, Savard, and Borgia, 2009), with 
the ultimate goal of the production of more and/or better off-
spring.  Demonstration of these benefits requires not only 
the measurement of that ability, it also requires measurement 
of how variability in that ability maps onto a tangible ben-
efit.  However, although most assume that being ‘smarter’ 
must be beneficial, the data are remarkably sparse.  Indeed, 
to our knowledge, perhaps the first data that might begin to 
confirm the smarter is better assumption have only just been 
published (Cole, Cram, & Quinn, 2012).  Cole et al. (2012) 
showed that great tits (Parus major) brought into the labo-
ratory for testing, that learned how to access food from a 
manmade dispenser, when returned to the wild, went on to 
lay more eggs over the following four years.  These birds 
also managed to spend less time feeding their offspring.  To 
show these effects Cole et al. (2012) tested, and then tracked 
in the field, over 400 individuals, a feat that many will find 
difficult to emulate.  However, while laying eggs would sug-
gest actual fitness benefits to greater problem-solving abili-
ties, the solver great tits were also more likely to desert their 
nests than were those tits that did not solve the food access 
problem.  In the medium term, then, problem-solving great 
tits did not produce more grand-offspring than did the non-
solvers.
 We (collectively) have a way to go before we have good 
evidence for fitness benefits of cognitive abilities.  However, 
we hope that our focus on our work on rufous hummingbirds 
shows that one can usefully address questions about cogni-
tive abilities in wild, free-living animals.  Furthermore, these 
data provide tentative evidence for natural selection acting 
on cognitive abilities: like food-storing songbirds and unlike 
non-food storing songbirds (e.g., Brodbeck, 1994), rufous 
hummingbirds place greater emphasis on spatial cues over 
colour cues, a hierarchy of cue preference that is correlated 
with their particular ecological demands.  However, it re-
mains to be seen whether other animals, living very differ-
ent lives, will pay attention to time as do the hummingbirds. 
Finally, if natural selection has shaped cognitive abilities as 
it appears, then the next challenge will be for us to determine 
what cognitive capabilities hummingbirds lack. 
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